Trust as indicator of robot functional and social acceptance. An





















Abstract ​To investigate the functional and social acceptance of a humanoid robot, we carried                           
out an experimental study with 56 adult participants and the iCub robot. Trust in the robot has                                 
been considered as a main indicator of acceptance in decision­making tasks characterized by                         
perceptual uncertainty (​e.g.​, evaluating the weight of two objects) and socio­cognitive                     
uncertainty (​e.g.​, evaluating which is the most suitable item in a specific context), and                           
measured by the participants’ conformation to the iCub’s answers to specific questions. In                         
particular, we were interested in understanding whether specific (i) user­related features (i.e.                       
desire for control), (ii) robot­related features (​i.e.​, attitude towards social influence of robots),                         
and (iii) context­related features (​i.e.​, collaborative vs. competitive scenario), may influence                     
their trust towards the iCub robot. We found that participants conformed more to the iCub’s                             
answers when their decisions were about functional issues than when they were about social                           
issues. Moreover, the few participants conforming to the iCub’s answers for social issues also                           
conformed less for functional issues. Trust in the robot’s functional savvy does not thus seem                             
to be a pre­requisite for trust in its social savvy. Finally, desire for control, attitude towards                               









Developing efficient human­robot partnership demands acceptance of robots in our daily                     
routines and environment. Acceptance is a sensitive topic of investigation in HRI research                         
(​e.g.​, Fridin & Belokopytov, 2014; de Graaf & Allouch, 2013; Young, Hawking, Sharlin, ​et                           
al. 2009; Heerink, Kröse, Wielinga, ​et al​., 2009; 2010; Salvini, Laschi, & Dario, 2010;                           
Welch, Lahiri, Warren, ​et al​., 2010; Weiss, Bernhaupt, Lankes, ​et al​., 2009; Riek &                           
Robinson, 2008; Kaplan, 2004). Traditionally defined as “the demonstrable willingness                   
within a user group to employ information technology for the tasks it is designed to support”                               
within the field of the User Acceptance​of Information Technology (Dillon, 2001), acceptance                         
takes on a new significance when referred to robots.  
Through an attentive survey of the literature, we can identify six connotations of robot                           
acceptance: representational, physical, behavioral, functional, social, and cultural (see                 1
Gaudiello, 2015 – Phd dissertation). Among these dimensions, functional and social                     
acceptances appear to play a key­role for effective human­robot interaction (Fridin ​et al​.,                         
2014; Weiss ​et al.,​ 2009; Picard & Daily, 2005; Zaad & Allouch, 2008).  
Functional acceptance refers to the level of perceived ease of use, usefulness (Heerink ​et al.​,                             
2009; Weiss​et al.​, 2009), accuracy (Beer, Prakash, Mitzner,​et al.​, 2011; Schaefer, 2013), and                             
innovativeness (Rogers, 1995; Kaplan, 2005) of the robot. Social acceptance covers a variety                         
of issues such as social presence (Riether, 2013; Hamill & Harper, 2006), perceived                         
sociability – often overlapping with social abilities and social intelligence (Heerink, 2010),                       
1 ​Representational acceptance describes the influence of the mental models (stereotypes from science fiction, representation                             
borrowed from preexistent mental models of technology, animals or children, etc.) on robot acceptance in terms of place attributed to the                                         
robot within common sense of ontology and suitable functions or roles of a robot.​Physical acceptance defines the embodiment features of                                         
the robot ­ its morphology (anthropomorphic, zoomorphic, machine­like), size (human or animal size vs. household appliance or toy size,                                     
etc.) materials (​e.g., organic vs. mechanic), etc – that could impact robot acceptance in terms of likeability and credibility of the robot.                                           
Behavioral acceptance concerns those behaviors – for example proxemics (​i.e., intimate vs. public distance, direction of approach, etc.), and                                     
communication (​e.g., verbal, gestural, etc.) – that can affect acceptance in terms of believability and fluency of interaction. Finally,​cultural                                       
acceptance refers to fundamental issues of a given culture, for example appetite for technology, social care, educational values, etc. which                                       
might alter acceptance in terms of intention to use and duration of use. 
and social​ influence (Nomura, Suzuki, Kanda, ​et al​., 2006) of robots.  
Interestingly, while representational (Gaudiello, Lefort & Zibetti, 2015) and cultural (Li, Rau                       
& Li, 2010) acceptance continuously vary with relation to user progressive familiarization to                         
robots (Bartneck, Suzuki, Kanda, ​et al​., 2007), and while we are likely to accept that a robot                                 
might have a rough physical aspect (Turkle, 2011), or to excuse the robot for an inappropriate                               
behavior like we would do with a child (Young​et al​., 2009), we are much less likely to accept                                     
a useless robot (Kaplan, 2005) and we can be deceived by a robot that lacks social abilities                                 
(Shaw­Garlock, 2009; Heerink, 2010).  
Today, robots endowed with functional and social abilities constitute two distinct categories                       
on the market (Shaw­Garlock, 2009), with distinct purposes and labels ­​e.g.​, ‘utilitarian’ and                           
‘hedonistic’ robots (Lee, Shin & Sundar, 2011). But robotic industry is definitely moving                         
towards robots which are both functional and social (Shaw­Garlock, 2009) and researchers                       
have advanced that users behavior will evolve accordingly: the more efficient a robot is, the                             
more people would be likely to trust them on all levels, including social level (Young ​et al​.,                                 
2009).  
Indeed, contemporary research points out that, when it comes to real interaction situations,                         
functional and social acceptance share a fundamental common ingredient: ​users’ trust in the                         
robot (Hancock, Billings, Schaefer, ​et al.​, 2011; Shinozawa, Naya, Yamato, ​et al.​, 2005).                         
Trust is thus increasingly employed to assess the quality of human­robot interaction                       
(Hoffman, Lee, Woods, ​et al.​, 2009; Schaefer, 2013; Lee & See, 2004; Yagoda, 2011; van                             
den Brule, Dotsch, Bijlstra, ​et al.​, 2014; Kaniarasu, Steinfeld, Desai, ​et al.​, 2012) and, as it                               
emerges from this literature, it constitutes a valid indicator of robot functional and social                           
acceptance (Yagoda, 2011).  
For example, suppose a person is asking its domestic robot to help in deciding which basket                               
of tomatoes is the heaviest. In this case the person would have to trust the robot functional                                 
answer (functional acceptance). Now, suppose the same person is asking to the robot which is                             
the necessary equipment to put in the swimming pool bag of his child (a swimming cap? Or                                 
maybe water sandals?). In this case the person would have to trust in the robot social answer                                 
(social acceptance). The question is: will the person trust the robot’s answer in both these                             
cases? As showed in our example, functional and social acceptance are characterized by the                           
same dynamics, but apply to very different issues, such as technical estimation ​vs. human                           
care, and presuppose very different built­in knowledge and performance of the robot. 
However, so far, the research models developed in the last decade to assess functional                           
acceptance of robots (Heerink ​et al​., 2009; Weiss ​et al​., 2009; Fridin​et al.​, 2014; Beer​et al​.,                                   
2011) mainly borrow their conceptual frame from older technology acceptance models                     
(Davis, Bagozzi & Warshaw,1989; Rogers, 1995; Venkatesh, Morris, Davi,​et al​., 2003) thus                         
neglecting the specificity of the robot as a social agent. Several studies however have                           
validated a significant set of indicators of social acceptance such as performance expectancy,                         
attitude towards technology, anxiety, etc. (Weiss ​et al​., 2009; see Heerink, 2010 for a review                             
of those indicators). 
But while those indicators can be useful to estimate the users’ willingness to accept robots in                               
a early phase of the interaction, trust can be a more eloquent indicator for daily and sustained                                 
interactions, in which users rely on robots to take decisions about functional and social issues.                             
To explain our position, let us go back to the tomatoes and swimming pool example.  
This kind of daily activities (​i.e.​, exchange information, take decisions, affirm one's point of                           
view, accept compromise), can be considered as problems (Popper, 1991). To solve these                         
problems we need to retrieve and apply knowledge that relates to either scientific rational                           
thinking or natural thinking ­​i.e.​, to common sense. These two kinds of thinking are based on                                 
different process, finalities, and content (Piaget, 1967; Guimelli, 1999; Jack, Dawson,                     
Begany, ​et al​., 2013). Scientific thinking seeks the truth through logical demonstration, and it                           
is supposed to result in a true solution. Here the decision­making process relies on the                             
examination of the objective knowledge on the physical world (Piaget, 1967; Popper, 1991).                         
The decision thus responds to the physical world itself and it is validated by the application of                                 
the rules (in our example, these rules are represented by conventional measures of weight).                           
On the opposite, natural thinking or common­sense (beliefs, knowledge, opinions) works                     
according to a subjective and/or social logic, whose finality is the achievement of pragmatic                           
solution, that is of the more appropriate solution in a given context (Guimelli, 1999). Here, the                               
decision­making process relies on subjective knowledge, and social norms (​e.g., Abric, 1994a,                       
b). The decision thus responds to personal evidence, which is connected to the common­sense                           
knowledge acquired through everyday experience. 
Now, in order to accept the robot help with relation to the first problem (the weight of the                                   
tomatoes basket) the person needs to rely on the robot’s scientific knowledge and technical                           
ability (​e.g.​, its force sensors) to provide an objective judgment. On the contrary, in the                             
second case (the choice between the head­cup and the thongs) the person needs to rely on the                                 
robot common­sense knowledge. So, in both cases there is an underlying inferential process                         
by which the person bases his/her trust on the robot knowledge or “savvy” (Young ​et al​.,                               
2009) called into the decisional process. 
Functional savvy refers thus to robot’s ability to efficiently operate by assuring useful and                           
accurate performances with relation to the functions it was designed for (Weiss ​et al.​, 2009;                             
Fridin ​et al​., 2014; Heerink, 2010). The tacit assumption about functional savvy is that, just                             
like computers, the robot is equipped with scientific knowledge about the physical world and                           
with powerful instruments (​e.g.​, sensors) to make much more precise measurements than a                         
human can do. This ability is considered a necessary condition by users to decide to employ a                                 
robot (Kaplan, 2005; Heerink ​et al​., 2009; Beer ​et al.,​ 2011). 
On the opposite, social savvy describes the robot’s capability to fit into the social structures                             
and activities of a given context (Young ​et al​., 2009) according to its role in the interaction                                 
(Welch ​et al​., 2010). The tacit assumption about functional savvy is that the robot possesses                             
common­sense knowledge, that is, knowledge of situations, behavioral scripts and current                     
norms that are in use (Dauthenhan, 2007; Hamill ​et al​., 2006).  
Therefore, within the limited scope of this research, we define functional acceptance as users                           
trust on robot functional savvy, and social acceptance as users trust on robot social savvy. 
However, caution should be used, since, as mentioned social savvy requires an adaptive                         
context­dependent knowledge, which cannot be hardwired into the robot and demand                     
complex learning algorithms which are continuously improved (Lockerd & Brazeal, 2004).                     
Consequently, even if users do have expectations about robot social savvy (Lohse, 2010;                         
Coeckelbergh, 2012), at the present stage of robots development, these expectations are rarely                         
confirmed (Duffy, 2003; Fong, Nourbakhsh & Dautenhahn, 2003).  
This explains why researchers presently call for the necessity of building measures which                         
could assess not only trust on robot functional savvy but also fine psychological aspects of                             
non­obvious trust on robot social savvy (Heerink, 2010). 
Several subjective measures of trust in the HRI research field have been developed and are                             
mostly based on self­report (​i.e.​, questionnaires). If these measures allow to collect users overt                           
opinions they also tend to induce a reflective mental posture, and are then limited in their                               
capacity to register those spontaneous opinions and inner beliefs that could allow to better                           
understand on which robot knowledge the users base their trust and which are the possible                             
relations that they establish between the functional and the social savvy.  
An alternative and complementary approach to test trust in machines comes from the classical                           
experimental paradigm of the Media Equation Theory (Nass & Moon, 2000; Nass, Fogg &                           
Moon, 1996; Nass, Moon, Fogg & Reeves, 1995). According to this theory, when engaged in                             
collaborative tasks, people tend to unconsciously accept computers as social entities: they                       
trust on answers provided by the computer and they conform to its answers. Nass and his                               
colleagues introduce then the concept of ​conformation to investigate users spontaneous or                       
‘mindless’ response to computer as an objective measure to evaluate levels of trust in machine                             
and its acceptance as a potential partner. Likewise, one of the research challenge today is thus                               
to design an experimental paradigm that enables to register those mindless reactions towards                         
robots which are susceptible of revealing users trust on robot, with particular attention for                           
trust on its functional and/or social savvy. 
For this reason, we have set the focus of our inquiry on the observation of users trust                                 
behaviors as an indicator of functional and social acceptance. Furthermore, inspired by the                         
work of Nass and his colleagues, we have proposed to adapt the well known Media Equation                               
Theory paradigm by employing users’ conformation to robots decisions as a new objective                         2
measure of human­robot trust during a human–humanoid decision making tasks under                     
uncertainty (Yu, 2015).  
By confronting users to tasks where they have to verbally express their decisions about                           
functional and social issues, we assess whether the fact of experiencing perceptual uncertainty                         
(​e.g.​, evaluating the weight of two slightly different objects) and socio­cognitive uncertainty                       
(​e.g.​, evaluating which is the most suitable item in a specific context) leads users to withdraw                               
their own decision and conform to the robot decision. 
Moreover, relying on those studies where it was proven that trust can generally vary                           
2 The Media Equation paradigm was transposed from human­computer interaction to human­robot interaction in                           
a study by Kidd (2003). However, our research intention is to adapt this paradigm to the specificity of the robot                                       
as a functional and social technology rather than to transpose it: instead of being confronted with a unique task                                     
such as the Desert Survival Problem, our participants are confronted with two tasks, respectively functional and                               
social. 
according to individual and contextual differences (Hancock ​et al​., 2011), we are also                         
interested in identifying a set of factors which are likely to correlate with trust in robot                               
functional and social savvy – such as individuals propensity to control (Burger & Cooper,                           
1979), fear of being influenced (Nomura ​et al​., 2006) and the context (competitive ​vs.                           






In order to answer to those questions we carried out an experimental study based on a                               
human­robot interaction with fifty­six adults and the humanoid robot iCub. In the following,                         
we will further illustrate the main issues of our research and bring evidences to justify the                               
experimental design choices of our investigation with regard to pre­existing studies in HRI                         
research. 
1. Trust as a fundamental indicator of acceptance  
Trust can determine the overall acceptance of a system (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). For this                             
reason, there is a considerable number of studies seeking a better understanding of the                           
human­robot trust dynamics (see Hancock Billings, Schaefer, ​et al​., 2011 for a meta­analysis).  
Broadly speaking, trust on system automation is classically defined as having confidence in                         
the system to do the appropriate action (Biros, Daly & Gunsch, 2004) with personal integrity                             
and reliability (Heerink ​et al​., 2009). Further definitions of trust borrowed from studies on                           
human­human trust, commonly known as interpersonal trust (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman,                     
1995; Rotter, 1971), focusing on expectations, common goals, uncertainty, and reliance as                       
core elements of trust (Billings, Schaefer, Lloren​et al., 2012). In this sense, trust describes the                               
expectation that a robot will help achieve an individual’s goals in a situation characterized by                             
uncertainty and by reliance of the individual on the robot (Hoffman ​et al., 2009; Lee ​et al​.,                                 
2004).  
The empirical works on human­robot trust carried in the latter half of the last decade (​e.g.​,                               
Lee ​et al​., 2004; Yagoda, 2011; Burke, Sims, Lazzara, ​et al.​, 2007) employ a variety of                               
measures that aim at detecting changes in users level of trust and also factors that might                               
decrease or enhance it (Schaefer, 2013), as we will outline in the following chapters in order                               
to argue the interest to consider conformation as an objective measure of trust in the robot                               
functional and social savvy. 
1.1 Commonly used measures of human­robot trust 
Two main categories of methods for assessing human­robot trust emerge in the literature: one                           
is based on subjective or explicit measures and another on objective or implicit measures. 
Objective measures can be retrieved from behavioral data (​e.g.​, response time) unconsciously                       
produced by individuals (Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, ​et al​., 2005), whereas                   
subjective measures (​i.e.​, questionnaires, self­report) can be retrieved from collected verbal                     
data (​e.g.​, opinions) consciously produced by the individuals. If the former are limitedly                         
developed in HRI, the latter are widely used.  
There are very few studies on the relation between trust and behavioral cues. The most                             
notable study in the field of HRI is from DeSteno ​et al​. (2012), which recorded face­to­face                               
verbal interactions between human participants and a tele­operated Nexi robot, to identify                       
sequences of non­verbal behaviors of the humans that could be used as indication of trust                             
towards the robot. They identified a set of four non­verbal cues (face touching, hands                           
touching, arms crossing and leaning backward) that, performed in sequences, are indicative of                         
untrustworthy behavior (DeSteno ​et al​., 2012; Lee ​et al​., 2013). 
Subjective measures, more frequently used in HRI researches, can range from questionnaires                       
including few statements ­ ​e.g.​, “​I would trust the robot if it gave me advice​, I would follow                                   
the advice the robot gives me” (Heerink ​et al​., 2009) ­ ranked by the users on a Likert scale,                                     
to more complex questionnaires addressing users prior experiences, reputation of the robot,                       
observed physical features, and perceived functional capabilities of the robot (Steinfield​et al​.,                         
2006). 
Furthermore, four types of scales have been developed to explicitly register attitudinal data on                           
human­robot trust (see Schaefer, 2013 for a detailed review). The​Propensity to trust is a scale                               
conceived to measure a stable and unique trait of the individual, and may provide useful                             
insights to predict the initial level of trust on robots (Yagoda, 2011). The​Trustworthiness​is a                               
scale related to the robot type, personality, intelligence, level of automation and perceived                         
function (Lee ​et al​., 2004) and can be used to measure the human­robot trust during their first                                 
approach. Similarly, the ​Affective trust scale is more appropriated in the initial stage of the                             
human­robot relationship: this scale refers to the individual attributions about the motives of a                           
partner to behave in a given way (Burke ​et al​., 2007). But of course trust is also important to                                     
support sustained interaction with robots. To this concern, the ​Cognition­based trust scale is                         
employed to observe the evolution of trust throughout time in terms of i) understanding of                             
robot functioning, ii) ability to interact with the robot, and iii) expectancy of the robot (Merritt                               
& Ilgen, 2008).  
However, as we have already pointed out (​cf.​, Introduction), unlike objective measures, which                         
are intended to assess immediate behavioral reactions, and thus may give access to people                           
inner beliefs, subjective measures are intended to assess verbally mediate reaction: the                       
procedure itself of posing questions to users about their trust in the robot can eventually alter                               
spontaneity and be not revealing of the effective trust towards robot. This is witnessed by the                               
fact that objective measures often show low correlations with explicit measures (Hoffman ​et                         
al​., 2005).  
Finally, to our knowledge very few works include both subjective and objective measures to                           
assess human­to­robot trust (​e.g.​, Joosse, Sardar, & Lohse, 2013). In such works the                         
employed objective measures mostly consist in collecting information about the distance that                       
the human maintains with respect to the robot during the interaction (​i.e.​, proxemics).                         
However, though proxemics measurements enables researchers to objectively register                 
information about perceived safety, which is determinant for acceptance of the robot presence                         
into the physical and social space (Eder, Harper & Leonards, 2014), which are undoubtedly                           
relevant for embodied aspects of functional and social acceptance, they have limited interest                         
with regards to the specific research objectives of the present study, that focus on trust in                               
robot savvy, thus tackling more psychological aspects of functional and social acceptance                       
such as human behavior in situations of uncertainty.  




An interesting experimental paradigm to investigate fine psychological aspects of people trust                       
in computer answers during a human­computer interaction comes from a set of studies which                           
gave birth to the so­called Media Equation Theory (Nass​et al​., 2000; Nass​et al., 1996; Nass,                                 
et al.​, 1995; Nass, Steuer, Henriksen ​et al​., 1993). This theory argues that people                           
unconsciously treat computers as social agents when asked to collaborate with them for                         
achieving a decision­making task. As an example, in a study by Nass ​et al​. (2000) adults                               
confronted with a ‘‘Desert Survival Problem’’ (Lafferty & Eady, 1974) had to rank, in                           
collaboration with a computer, 12 items (​e.g.​, a knife, a flashlight, etc.) in order of importance                               
for survival in the desert. Unknown to the subjects, the computer’s rankings were                         
systematically dissimilar to each subject’s ranking (for instance, if a subject ranked an item as                             
number 2, the computer would automatically rank that item as number 5, and so on). After                               
having read the computer ranking, subjects were allowed to change their ranking or to leave it                               
as it was. Results showed that participants who were told that the task achievement will                             
depend on their collaboration with the computer and not on the human decision solely or of                               
the computer solely trust more in the quality of the information provided by the computer, and                               
consequently conform more to the computer’s answer. 
In this sense, conformation, that means to withdraw one’s decision in order to comply with                             
the machine decision, constitutes a pertinent measure to straightforwardly registering whether                     
the users trust in the agent savvy more than in their own savvy.  
Moreover, conformation as an objective measure has a specific relevance in HRI tasks where                           
users are supposed to collaborate with, or delegate to, robots. These kinds of task typically                             
require to share duties and responsibilities, as well as to mutually adjust, so that it is important                                 




In their meta­analysis, Hancock and colleagues (2011) examine the factors influencing robot                       
trust and gather the results of this examination in a three­factor model. These three factors are:                               
human­related factors (​e.g.​, personality traits), robot­related factors (​e.g.​, beliefs about robot),                     
and environmental­related factors (​e.g.​, type of interaction in a given environment). Following                       







It has been proved that personality traits influence people acceptance of technology in general                           
(Alavi & Joachimsthaler, 1992) and robots in particular (Fischer, 2011; Looije, Neerincx &                         
Cnossen, 2010; Weiss ​et al​., 2008).  
For example, extroverts tend to trust robots more than introverts (McBride & Morgan, 2010).                           
Other personality traits such as "proactiveness", "social reluctance", "timidity", and                   
"nervousness", have also been observed with relation to robot acceptance (Walters ​et al​.,                         
2005; Yagoda, 2011; Merritt & Ilgen, 2008). For example, people who score higher on                           
proactiveness keep a higher distance from the robot than others (Walters ​et al​., 2005). 
However, as the dynamics of trust itself implies that the “trustor expects the trustee to perform                               
helpful actions irrespective of the ability to control him” (Mayer ​et al​., 1995), a crucial                             
personality trait to examine in a study about human trust in robots is ​desire for control                               
(Burger ​et al​., 1979) that is the intrinsic and personal tendency of a person to control the                                 
events in one's life (Burger ​et al​., 1979). 
The relevance of this personality trait with respect to human­robot trust is even more evident                             
when we consider that robotic engineering is progressing on prototypes of robots which are                           
more and more autonomous, and aspire to achieve a complete autonomy of robots to take care                               
of functional tasks such as removing lawn or social task such as assisting elderly people                             
(Thrun, 2004; Yanco & Drury, 2002).  
To this concern, several studies have preventively tested users reactions to prospected                       
scenarios where robots would entirely operate without human control. For example, it has                         
been demonstrated that male participants do not let the robot come close if it operates in                               
autonomous mode (Syrdal​et al​., 2007; Kamide​et al​., 2013, Koay​et al​., 2014). Another study                               
on approach initiation by Okita, Ng­Thow­Hing and Sarvadevabhatla (2012) shows that                     
participants feel reassured if the robot asks permission by verbal or non­verbal                       
communication before starting an interaction. Finally, several works point out that users                       
prefer a robot that, though being able of adaptive behavior, still leaves the user in control                               
(Gilles & Ballin, 2004; Marble, David, Bruemmer, ​et al​., 2004; Heerink, 2010). 
These studies seem to witness that users may still not be totally open to a fully unconditioned                                 
trust in robot functional and social savvy. However, the role of individual propensity to                           
control with relation to these low­trust behaviors has still not been clarified. No study, to the                               
best of our knowledge, observed users desire for control in the context of HRI. Nevertheless,                             
it is reasonable to think that desire for control can diminish users’ willingness that robots are                               
in charge of a task, have a leader role or are even of part of it. With relation to our study,                                         




Attitudes towards robots are crucial for successful acceptance of robot as well (Destephe,                         
Brandao, Kishi, ​et al​. 2015; Wullenkord & Eyssel, 2014). By attitude, we mean any mental                             
disposition matured through experience that might impact the reactions (behavioral, verbal,                     
emotional) of the individual towards objects and situations (Alport, 1935; Ostrom, 1969;                       
Regan & Fazio, 1977). While desire for control constitutes a stable trait of personality,                           
attitudes towards robot are more contingent: they can vary according to cultures (Kaplan,                         
2004; Li ​et al​., 2010) as well as to the people’s acquaintance to robots (Bartneck​et al​., 2007)                                   
and they can change through time (Sung, Grinter & Christensen, 2010). Observing the attitude                           
makes then possible to predict the actual and potential trust behavior of an individual towards                             
the robot.  
In HRI research attitudes towards robots are generally assessed trough the use of tests and                             
questionnaires. Among the most common attitude assessment tests, there is the Negative                       
Attitudes towards Robots Scale (NARS, Nomura​et al​., 200​6​). This test has been conceived to                             
cover three types of negative attitudes: (i) negative attitude towards situations of interaction                         
with robots (for ex., “​I would feel nervous operating a robot in front of other people​”); (ii)                                 
towards social influence of robots (for ex., “​I am concerned that robots would be a bad                               
influence on children​”); and, (iii) towards emotions in interaction with robots (“​I feel                         
comforted being with robots that have emotions​”). The NARS is thus composed of three                           
different subscales, with each subscale including a list of statements that the respondent is                           
invited to rate on a Likert scale from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree).  
Subscale 2 in particular focus on negative attitudes towards social influence of robots and it is                               
thus especially relevant with relation to trust in social savvy. In this sense, negative attitudes                             
could influence users mistrust in the possibility that a robot might fit social structures. Thus,                             
we might expect that the more people show negative attitudes towards social influence of                           
robots the less they trust robot’s decisions with regard to social issues. Furthermore, the                           
NARS­S2 is also relevant to our methodological choice of employing conformation as a                         




Different proposals to reduce negative attitudes towards robot through simulation of real and                         
imagined HRI scenario were put forward in recent studies. Kidd (2003) for example,                         
simulated two types of real scenarios: one that demanded collaboration with robots and                         
another in which robots were just used to learn by a robotic teacher. As an outcome, the                                 
collaboration scenario raised more trust than the teaching scenario: the users perceived the                         
information provided by the robot of higher quality, and trusted the robot to a greater extent. 
Kuchenbrandt and Eyssel (2012) borrowed the experimental paradigm of ‘imagined contact’                     
(Crisp & Turner, 2009) from Social Psychology to assess whether the fact of asking people to                               
close their eyes and imagine different types of HRI scenario has an effect on robot                             
acceptance. Results showed that after having imagined an interaction with the robot,                       
participants exhibited less negative attitudes and less anxiety towards robots. These effects                       
were stronger for cooperative than for competitive and neutral imagined interaction.                     
Conversely, in a subsequent study Wullenkord ​et al​. (2014) reproduced a similar scenario but                           
obtained different results: participants who had imagined contact with a robot did not report                           
more positive attitudes towards robots nor they showed higher contact intentions with it than                           
participants who had imagined contact with a human or with other kinds of technical devices. 
It thus seems that giving users the possibility to project themselves in the context of the                               
interaction has contrasting effects on the acceptance of robots. However, simulating                     
collaborative and cooperative scenario is especially suitable in relation to functional and                       
social tasks where humans and robots are supposed to collaborate for joint objectives ­ and                             





On the basis of the examined literature, the aims of our study are: (i) to investigate whether                                 
participants conform their decisions to robot’s answer when experiencing uncertainty during a                       
decision­making task with respect to functional and social issues; (ii) to assess the speculative                           
assumption according to which trust in social savvy requires trust in functional savvy; and                           
(iii) to investigate to what extent desire for control, negative attitudes towards robot social                           
influence, and collaborative vs. competitive scenario can be considered as factors influencing                       
the robot’s acceptance in terms of trust. 
To this aim we carried out a two steps experiment with fifty­six adult participants and an iCub                                 
robot. First, to gather information about their trusting profiles, participants were invited to fill                           
up two questionnaires ­ Desire for Control (DFC; Burger ​et al​., 1979) and Negative Attitude                             
Towards Robots (NARS; Nomura ​et al.​, 2006) two weeks before the day of interaction with                             
the iCub robot.  
Later, the day of the interaction with iCub, to assess whether trustors internal image of the                               
type of the interaction that they will have with the iCub impacts on their trust on the robot, the                                     
participants were assigned to one of the three groups and asked to imagine a specific HRI                               
scenario (​i.e.​, collaborative, competitive, and neutral) (Kuchenbrandt​et al​., 2012; Wullenkord                     
et al​., 2014). 
Finally, participants were confronted with two different decision­making tasks.  
In the first task (called ​functional task​), participants were presented a set of physical stimuli                             
they had to compare a specific perceptual characteristic (​i.e.​, the relative weight of two                           
objects, the relative pitch of two sound, and a picture containing different colors). Right after,                             
they were asked to decide which were the heaviest object, the most high­pitched sound, and                             
the predominant color. In a second moment, the experimenter presented iCub with the same                           
set of physical stimuli and asked the robot the same question. Participants listened to the iCub                               
answers, and were asked if they would like to keep their initial decision or change it. This first                                   
set of physical stimuli and related questions refer to the ​robot functional savvy​. 
In the second task (called​social task​), participants were presented a set of paired items (​e.g.​, a                                 
head­cup and a pair of thongs), and again asked to decide which of the item was the more                                   
suitable with relation to a specific social context (​e.g.​, a swimming­pool). In a second                           
moment, the experimenter did the same with iCub. After having listened to iCub answer,                           
participants were allowed to change their decision. This second set of stimuli and related                           
questions refer to the ​robot social savvy​. 
Inspired by Nass & Moon works on users social responses to computers (Nass ​et al​., 2000;                               
Nass ​et al​., 1996; Nass ​et al​., 1995) we considered conformation, meant as participants’                           
modification of their initial decision in compliance with robot answers, as a measure of trust. 
We formulated the following five hypotheses: 
H1 Participants trust the robot functional savvy more than the robot social savvy. ​As                           
different studies pointed out, trust is a key component of human­robot interaction (Schaefer,                         
2013; Hancock ​et al., 2011) and a valid indicator of acceptance (Yagoda, 2011; Parasuraman                           
et al.​, 1997). Since Nass ​et al​. (1996) demonstrated that humans tend to express trust in                               
computer through conformation to its answers, we expect that a similar phenomenon might                         
appear during HRI, but according to the specificity of the robot as a functional and social                               
technology. Such specificity implies that while users consider functional savvy as                     
indispensible for accepting the robot (Kaplan, 2005; Heerink ​et al.​, 2009; Weiss​et al​., 2009;                             
Fridin​et al​., 2014; Beer​et al​., 2011), social savvy is rather a desirable feature to them (Lohse,                                   
2010; Dauthenhan, 2007; Coeckelbergh, 2012​). Thus, we predict that participants will                     
conform more to functional than to social answers of the robot. 
H2​Participants do not trust the social savvy uniquely: trust in the social savvy should be                               
supported by trust in the functional savvy​. As the literature shows, though participants                         
expect robots to have social savvy, these expectations are often deceived during real                         
interaction (Fong, 2003; Duffy, 2003; Coeckelbergh, 2012). Thus, we predict that no                       
participant will conform to iCub answers in the social task uniquely. 
H3 Participants who imagine a collaborative HRI scenario tend to trust more the robot                           
than participants who imagine a competitive or neutral scenario. Previous studies                     
(Kuchenbrandt ​et al​., 2012) have demonstrated that imagined contact with robots makes                       
people more confident towards a real robot, when the imagined scenario is a collaborative                           
one. Consequently, we predict that participants having imagined a collaborative interaction                     
with the robot will conform more to iCub answers both in the functional and social task.  
H4 The more participants display a negative attitude towards the social influence of the                           
robot, the less they trust the robot social savvy. ​The statements of the S2 sub­scale of the                                 
NARS mostly concern the negative feelings of people with relation to the possibility that the                             
robot could influence or dominate them, and that they could depend on robots. Therefore, we                             
predict that participants who score high on the NARS­S2 will not conform to the iCub’s                             
answers in the social tasks (a high score on the NARS­S2 will be negatively correlated with                               
the social conformation scores). 
H5 The more participants show a strong desire for control as a personality trait, the less                               
they will trust the robot’s functional and social savvy. ​Despite robotics technology is                         
rapidly evolving towards fully autonomous artificial agents (Thrun, 2004; Yanco​et al​., 2002)                         
still users feel more confident in the interaction with robots if the robots are controlled by a                                 
human (Syrdal ​et al​., 2007; Kamide ​et al​., 2013, Koay ​et al​., 2014; Okita et al​., 2012; Gilles                                   
et al​., 2004; Marble ​et al​., 2004; Heerink, 2010). It is thus reasonable to think that individual                                 
differences in the desire for control (Burger ​et al​., 1979) might influence trust in robots.                             
Therefore, we predict that the more participants score high on the DFC test, the less they will                                 





Fifty six voluntary healthy adults took part in the study: 37 women and 19 men. Nine were                                 
recruited at the Paris 6 University, 17 from the Paris 8 University, and 30 through a web “call                                   
for participants” placed on the Cognitive Sciences Information Network (RISC). They were                       
all native French speakers, aged 19 to 65 (Average age = 36.95; σ = 14.32). As a token of                                     
appreciation, the participants received a gift voucher worth ten Euros. Participants signed an                         




The experiments were conducted in the Institut des Systèmes Intelligents et de Robotique                         
(Paris, France), in the experimental room of the iCub robot. The experimental setup was                           
organized as shown in Figure 1. The robot was standing on a fixed pole. A reflective wall (a                                   
plastic divider with reflective surface) was built to create a private space for them to interact                               
with the robot, in particular to prevent the participants to see the robot’s operator. The                             
participant and the experimenter were seated in front of the robot, with the experimenter being                             
on the right of the participant. The position of the seats with respect to the robot was fixed and                                     
equal for all the participants. Between the robot and the experimenter, a LCD screen                           
connected to a computer was used to display images related to the functional and social tasks.                               
Two cameras were observing the participants: one camera was placed behind the robot on its                             
left side, in such a way to observe the human face and upper­body during the interaction with                                 
the robot; the other camera was placed laterally to take the scene as a whole, observing the                                 
overall behavior of the participants. 
 
 Figure 1 ­ Experimental setting. The human and the participant are seated in front of the iCub robot. An operator, hidden                                         
behind a wall and not visible by the participant, monitors the experiment and controls the robot to generate appropriate                                     
gestures and answers to questions. 
 
The iCub robot and the Wizard of Oz paradigm: The participants were interacting with the                             
iCub humanoid robot (Natale ​et al.​, 2012). The robot is approximately 104 cm high, weights                             3
about 24 kg, and has the shape of a 4 years old child. The robot was standing on a fixed pole                                         
so that it could not fall. As a safety measure, the robot was constantly monitored by the                                 
operator and controlled in impedance, to make it compliant in case people would touch it                             
accidentally or intentionally during the experiment (Fumagalli​et al.​, 2012). The experimenter                       
was also able to stop the robot in case of urgency at any time using the robot safety button;                                     
however, there was no use of this measure during the experiments, as the interaction flew                             
without problems for all the participants.  
Facial expressions and speech were enabled. During the experiments, the robot always                       
assumed the same neutral/positive expressions, to avoid confusing the participant or suggest                       
that the participant’s actions could arouse an eventual robot “emotional status”. 
The robot was able to answer to the questions of the functional and social tasks: the verbal                                 
answers were pre­programmed in advance by the experimenter, though the operator was able                         
to type new sentences on­the­fly and make the robot speak in case of unforeseen questions by                               
the participants. 
3 The iCub humanoid robot is the outcome of the European RobotCub project : http://www.robotcub.org 
This was made possible by implementing the Wizard of Oz paradigm (​cf.​, Riek, 2012 for a                               
critical review). In the Wizard of Oz setting the participants think they are interacting with an                               
autonomous system, while in fact the system is partly or completely operated by an operator                             
who is remotely in command of the robot. This paradigm allows the operator to control the                               
robot’s behavior in real time. To facilitate the control of the robot by the operator, we                               






The first was a French adaptation of the Negative Attitude towards Robots Scale (NARS;                           4
Nomura ​et al.​, 2006). Among the three subscales composing this test, we adopted the second                             
subscale (Negative attitude towards the social influence of robots) as a measure of attitude                           
towards social influence of robots. This subscale includes five sentences: (i) I would feel                           
uneasy if robots really had emotions; (ii) Something bad might happen if robots developed                           
into living beings; (iii) I feel that if I depend on robots too much, something bad might                                 
happens; (iv) I am concerned that robots would have a bad influence on children; (v) I feel                                 
that in the future society will be dominated by robots. (Annex 2, Table 1). Subjects were                               
required to answer on a Likert­type scale, from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree). 
The second questionnaire was a French adaptation of the Desire For Control scale (DFC,                           
Burger & Cooper, 1979), which we have employed as a measure of participants’ desire for                             
control. ​Twenty questions such as « I'd rather run my own business and make my own                             







In the task designed to test the trust in the robot functional savvy, the participant had to                                 
answer to a series of questions about images (Fig. 2 and 3), sounds and weights (Fig.4 and 5).                                   
The experimenter would ask each question to the participant, then to the robot, and finally                             
would ask the participant whether he/she would like to confirm or change his/her answer so                             
that the participants and the robot could disagree or agree.  
In the sound sub­task, the experimenter asked “Which is the most high­pitched sound: the first                             
or the second?”. In the image sub­task, the experimenter asked: “Which is the dominant color                             
in this image”? In the weight sub­task, the question was: “Which is the heaviest object?” 
Each subtask was composed of 4 evaluations, where a pair of items was compared. Among                             
the 4 pairs of stimuli, 3 were ambiguous (​i.e.​, the two items slightly different) and 1 was not                                   
ambiguous (the two items were very different). Ambiguous stimuli were introduced to assess                         
users’ behavior in situation of strong uncertainty (the 3 sub­tasks are detailed in Annex 3). 
The strategy for the robot answers was to always contradict the participant, except in the case                               
where the items were completely unambiguous. This required the operator to listen to the                           5
participant’s answer and choose the appropriate answer each time. The answers were                       
pre­programmed and available as a list on the GUI (Annex 1, Figure 2). The order of the                                 
sub­tasks would randomly vary for each participant. 
 
5 With a slight change with respect to the original paradigm (Nass​et al​., 1996), we decided to let the robot agree                                           
with the participant in the non­ambiguous questions, so that the participants could not be induced to think that the                                     
robot was always contradicting the human by default, or that the robot was faulty or lying in some way. This                                       
decision was taken in the design phase of the experiment, after some tests with subjects in our laboratory, who                                     
reported to have the impression that the robot had a strategy in contradicting them in cases where the right                                     









Figure 4­ Functional task: the bottles used in the evaluation of weight. 1) two identical bottles of same weight 2) two similar                                           
bottles of different colors and very different weight 3) two similar bottles of almost the same weight 4) two different bottles                                         
of almost the same weight. 
 





In the task designed to test the trust in the robot social savvy, the participant had to answer to                                     
three questions ​, by choosing which item between two is the most appropriate for a given                             6
context or situation (​i.e.​, at school, in a swimming pool, rainy day). As for the functional task,                                 
two items were compared (Figures 6a, 6b, and 6c), and the experimenter would ask each                             
question (“Which is the most important object at <context>: the <first item> or the <second                             
item>?”) to the participant, then to the robot, and then would ask the participant to confirm or                                 
not his/her choice (Figure 7). They (​i.e.​, the participant and the robot) could disagree or agree,                               
and there was no “right answer”.  
While in the functional task the evaluations on the perceptual characteristics of the stimuli                           
were based on objective measures (even if difficult to discern in the ambiguous or equal case),                               
here, evaluation was basically based on a subjective and personal judgment. Hence, the                         
strategy chosen by the experimenter for the robot answers was to always contradict the                           
participant as done by Nass ​et al. (1996). Again, this required the operator to listen to the                                 












Figure 6a­b­c­ Social task: Q1: at school, which is the most important object: 1) the computer or 2) the notebook?; Q2: at the                                             







The present study was part of the Engagement During Human­Humanoid Interaction (EDHHI                     
) project. The human­robot interaction protocol applied in this project was validated by the                           7
Ethical Evaluation Council for Researches on Health Issues (CERES) ​. 8
Volunteers who took part in the experiment were required to fill up two questionnaires on line                               
at least one week before their visit to the Institute for Intelligent Systems and Robotics (ISIR).                               
These two questionnaires were: (i) Negative Attitude towards Robots Scale (NARS, Nomura                       
et al​., 2006), and (ii) Desire For Control scale (DFC; Burger ​et al​., 1979). 
The day of the experiment, participants were welcomed by the researcher and informed about                           
the overall procedure before signing an informed consent form granting us the use of all the                               
7 http://www.smart­labex.fr/index.php?perma=EDHHI​ and ​http://www.loria.fr/~sivaldi/edhhi.htm  
8 IRB n.20135200001072 
recorded data for research purposes. Each participant was equipped with a Lavalier                       
microphone to ensure a clear speech data collection. 
Before the experiment, the participants had to watch a short video presenting the iCub, its                             
body parts and some of its basic movements. The video did not provide any information                             9
about the experiments. It was instrumental to make sure that the participants had a uniform                             
prior knowledge of the robot appearance (some participants may have seen the robot before                           
on the media).  
The 56 participants were all confronted to the two tasks. One group (N = 21) was asked to                                   
imagine a collaborative scenario (G1), while a second group (G2) was asked to imagine a                             
competitive scenario (N= 21). Finally, the control group (G3) was instructed to imagine a                           
neutral scenario (N= 14). The instructions related to the imagined scenarios varied according                         
to the experimental conditions as follows. Instructions ​to elicit a collaborative (G1),                       






Competitive  Imagine that in two years you will             
be working with robots to build           
some objects: you will be in           
competition. The one that will have           
built the best object will win a             
prime. 
Imagine this scenario in detail for a             
minute. 
Imaginez que dans deux ans vous           
travaillerez avec des robots pour         
construire des objets : vous serez en             
compétition. Celui qui aura construit le           
plus bel objet gagnera une prime. 
Imaginez ce scénario de façon détaillé,           
pendant une minute. 
 
Neutral  Imagine that in two years you will             
work with robots. You will have to             
build some nice objects. 
Imagine this scenario in detail for a             
minute. 
Imaginez que dans deux ans vous           
travaillerez avec des robots. Vous devez           
construire de beaux objets. 










Imagine that in two years you will             
work with robots to build some           
objects: you will make a duo with             
one of them and will have to             
collaborate to build some object.         
As a duo you can win a prime if the                   
object is well built. 
Imagine this scenario in detail for a             
minute. 
Imaginez que dans deux ans vous           
travaillerez avec des robots pour         
construire de objets : vous formez un             
binôme avec un d’entre eux et vous             
devez collaborer pour construire       
l’objet. En tant que binôme vous pouvez             
gagner une prime si l’objet est bien             
construit. 




The experimenter did not present the experimental setup (​e.g.​, show the location of the                           
cameras) except showing the robot, and she/he did not provide any specific instruction to the                             
participants about what to do or say and how to behave with the robot. Most importantly,                               
she/he did not say anything about the way the robot was controlled: since the operator was                               
hidden behind a wall, mixed with other students of the lab, the participant had no cue that                                 
someone else controlled the robot.  10
The robot was standing on its fixed pole, gently waving the hands and looking upright. It was                                 
not speaking. Once the participants were standing and looking in front of the robot, they were                               
free to do whatever they wanted: talk to the robot, touch it, and so on. The experimenter took                                   
seat on the right of the participant, in front of the robot, and invited the participant to take the                                     
10 After the experiment, we asked the participants if they thought or had the impression that someone controlled the robot: all 
the participants thought that the robot was fully autonomous. 
other seat. The experimenter then provided verbal instructions for the experiment, consisting                       
of two tasks: a functional evaluation task, aimed at assessing the trust in the robot’s​functional                               
savvy​, and a social evaluation task, aimed at assessing the trust in the robot’s ​social savvy​.                               
The participants executed the two tasks in a random order. 
Upon task completion, participants were asked to rate, on a 7­points scale whether they                           
reminded the imagined scenario as competitive or collaborative (1=very competitive; 7=very                     
collaborative) to ensure that they actually imagined the proposed scenario. 
The interaction task lasted on average 30 minute per participant. The whole experiment took                           
place in individual sessions in the experimental lab room of the iCub and it lasted on average                                 
50 minutes for each participant. 




The participants and the robot responses were recorded on an individual sheet by the                           
experimenter, and could be additionally retrieved by the audio and video recordings.  
Answers to the questions addressed during the functional and social tasks were used to create                             
quantitative measures of participants trust in robot functional and social savvy. The registered                         
data consisted in the participants’ conformation to, or disagreement with, the robot answers. 
A conformation score was calculated dividing the number of instances where the participant                         
changed his/her answer to match the robot’s answer (conformation) by the total number of                           
instances where the robot’s answer was in disagreement with the participant’s first answer.                         
Hence, acceptance score may take a value from 0 (disagreement) to 1 (conformation).  
Responses to the two questionnaires were used to create quantitative measures of participants’                         
desire for control and of attitudes towards social influence of robot. Scores to the S2­NARS                             
questionnaire were calculated in compliance with the method recommended by the authors                       
(Nomura ​et al.​, 2006). S2 score may range ​from 0 to 35​. A high score indicates negative                                 
attitudes towards social influence of robots. Scores to the Desire for Control scale (Burger​et                             
al.​, 1979) were calculated ​according to the authors’ method. Score may ​range from 0 to 140​.                               
A high score indicates a strong desire for control. Over 56 participants, only 51 filled                             
correctly the DCF questionnaire. The results based on the DFC scale are obtained by retaining                             
only these 51 participants.  
These three scores were used as dependent variables. As the functional and social                         




4.1 Do participants conform more their answer to iCub answer in the functional task                           
than in the social task? (H1) 
The conformation score obtained on the functional and social questions ranked from 0 (never                           
conform) to 1 (always conform). In order to calculate to which extent participants trust robots                             
during functional and social tasks, we considered a score threshold of 0.5, which is the middle                               
of the score scale, ranging from 0 to 1. We thus esteemed that a conformation score higher or                                   
equal to 0.5 in each of the two tasks reveals a participant’s trust in the robot’s savvy.  
Descriptive analysis performed on the 840 [=56*(12+3)] participants’ answers reveal that the                     
average conformation score for the functional task is 0.315 (σ=0.201), while the average                         
conformation score for the social task is 0.199 (σ=0.221). In both functional and social tasks                             
the mean score are lower than 0.5 indicating that overall participants do not conform so easily                               
to the robot’s answers. However, Wilcoxon’s test for paired samples lets emerge a significant                           
difference (V=981; p<.001) between these two scores. Participants tend to conform more to                         




4.2 Do participants who conform to iCub in the social task also conform in the                             
functional task? (H2) 
Among the 56 participants, 13 have obtained a high functional conformation score (≥ 0.5)                           








11 Our data show that the majority of our participants (92.8%) present a low conformation score in the social task revealing                                         
the following distribution: (always disagree) 0 (48.2%), 0.33 (44.6%), 0.5 (1.8%), 0.67 (3.6%) and 1(1.8%) (always                               
conform). 
 
 Such a low number of participants showing a high conformation score in the social task does                               
not allow to carry statistical tests. However, we may observe that two of these three                             
participants have also obtained a lower score for functional task and one a score equal to 0.5,                                 
which is the threshold of low/high score. These results tend not to confirm our second                             
hypothesis,​i.e.​, that participants do not trust social savvy uniquely, so that those who conform                             
to the robot in the social task also would have conformed in the functional task. 
4.3 Does the imagined HRI scenario influence trust in iCub? (H3​) 
To assess whether the two scenarios had an impact on participants conformation we                         
performed a non parametric ANOVA (Kruskal­Wallis test). The main between­subject factor                     
is the scenario condition (3 levels: collaborative, competitive and neutral). The dependent                       
variables are the functional and social conformation scores. 
Results do not show any effect of the imagined HRI scenario on the participants’                           
conformation score in the functional task (Chi2=1.69; p=N.S.) – see Fig.9 – nor in the social                               
task (Chi2=1.63; p=N.S.) – see Fig. 10. Thus, our fourth hypothesis was not confirmed:                           




 After the task, we checked whether participants remembered the type of scenario described by                           
the experimenter (collaborative, competitive, and neutral scenario). To do so, we asked the                         
participants to rate, on a 7­points scale (1=very competitive; 7=very collaborative), whether                       
they reminded the kind of scenario they have imagined. We carried out a non­parametric                           
ANOVA with this score as dependent variable and the imagined scenario as factor. Results                           
show a significant difference among the three imagined scenario (M​compet​=3.57; M​neutral​=4.76;                     
M​collabe​=5.21; Chi2=13.83; p<.001). Moreover the Wilcoxon post­hoc tests allow us to observe                       
that there is a significant difference between competitive and neutral scenario (W=325.5;                       
p<.001), and between competitive and collaborative scenario (W=245.5; p<.001). While no                     
significant difference has been registered between collaborative and neutral scenario (W=177;                     
p=N.S.). 
These results show that the participants in the competitive group tend to remind the scenario                             
as less competitive than actually described in the instructions given by the experimenter.                         
Therefore, our results showing no effect of the scenario on functional (Fig. 9) and social (Fig                               
10) conformation should be taken carefully. 
 
4.4. Is there a correlation between negative attitudes to robot social influence and the                           
trust in the robot social savvy? (H4) 
Descriptive analysis of the NARS­S2 (subscale 2 of NARS) scores shows that they follow a                             
normal distribution (W=.977; p=N.S test of Shapiro) : M=18.80; SD=5.83. In order to identify                         
a potential correlation between the conformation score and those of the NARS­S2, we                         
performed a Spearman non­parametric test of correlation (Fig.11). Results do not show any                         
significant correlation between the conformation score in the functional task and the score                         
assessing the negative attitude towards the social influence of robots (NARS­S2) (ρ=.127;                       
p=N.S.) nor between the conformation score in the social task and the NARS­S2 attitude                           
score (ρ=.127; p=N.S.). No difference on this correlation was observed in each of the 3                             
imagined scenarios. 
These results infirm the hypothesis that a negative attitude towards social influence of robots                           
negatively correlates with the trust in the robot social ​savvy expressed by the conformation                           
score​. 
 
Figure 11­ Correlation matrix ​between the conformation score of the functional and social task those of the                                 
S2­NARS. 
 
4.5 Is there a correlation between the human desire for control and the trust in the robot                                 
functional and social savvy? (H5) 
Descriptive analysis of the DFC scores shows that they follow a normal distribution (W=.964;                           
p=N.S. test de Shapiro): M=98.7; SD=11.1. ​To identify a potential correlation between the                         
conformation scores and the “desire for control” (DFC) scores, we performed a                       
non­parametric correlation Spearman test (Fig. 12). Results do not show any correlation                       
between the conformation scores in the functional task and the DFC score (ρ=­.086; p=N.S.),                           
nor between the conformation scores in the social task and the DFC score ρ=.137; p=N.S.).                             
No difference in this correlation was observed on each of the 3 imagined scenarios. 
These results do not confirm the hypothesis that desire for control negatively correlates with                           
the trust in the robot’s functional and social savvy expressed by the conformation score. 







Based on the studies showing that the user’s trust is a fundamental ingredient of HRI and can                                 
thus be employed as an indicator of robot acceptance (Hancock ​et al​., 2011; Schaefer, 2013;                             
Ososky ​et al., 2013; Parasuraman ​et al​., 1997), the present study aims at gaining insights into                               
the human­robot trust dynamics that could affect the acceptance of robots in daily situations.  
In particular, we were interested at investigating trust in functional savvy (Heerink 2010;                         
Shaw­Garlock, 2009; Fridin ​et al​., 2014) as an indicator of users acceptance of the robot as                               
functional agent, and trust in social savvy (Weiss​et al​., 2009; Young​et al​., 2009; de Graaf​et                                   
al.​, 2015) as an indicator of acceptance of the robot as a social agent. 
While several empirical studies prove that people do trust the computers’ social savvy during                           
human­computer collaborative interaction (Nass ​et al​., 1996; Nass ​et al.​, 1995), it is still not                             
clear if this holds true for human­robot and particularly for human­humanoid interaction.                       
Indeed, users consider functional savvy as indispensible for accepting the robot (Kaplan,                       
2005; Heerink ​et al.​, 2009; Weiss ​et al​., 2009; Fridin ​et al​., 2014; Beer ​et al​., 2011), social                                   
savvy is rather desirable (Lohse, 2010; Dauthenhan, 2007) – but sometimes deceptive                       
(Coeckelbergh, 2012; Duffy, 1993). 
Thus, the first purpose of our study was to find out whether users trust robots both when                                 
required to take decisions on functional issues and when required to do it on social issues. The                                 
Media Equation Theory paradigm (Nass ​et al.​, 2000) provides a sound basis to investigate                           
trust in technology by registering users’ conformation or disagreement with computers. Based                     
on this experimental paradigm and on above presented research on robots acceptance, we                         
hypothesized that trust in functional savvy should be more common than trust in social savvy                             
and predicted that participants would have conformed to iCub answers more in functional                         
than in social decision­making tasks.  
Results show that in general participants do not easily conform to iCub answers. However,                           
those who conformed mostly did it in the functional task. Hence, our first hypothesis was                             
partially confirmed: participants tended to see the robot as untrustworthy, or at least not                           
enough trustworthy to take better decisions than humans, except when these decisions                       
concerned functional issues, which require high­precision technical skills to discriminate a                     
specific perceptual characteristic of the stimuli. In this case the participants relied on the robot                             
functional savvy and accepted more often that the iCub’s answer determines their final                         
decision. The exam of verbal registrations of the participants’ answers confirms this reliance:                         
several participants reported that they preferred to rely on the iCub’s perception than on their                             
own perception. Furthermore, these registrations make us remark that participants who not                       
conformed in the functional task motivated their lack of conformation to their expertise in a                             
specific domain related to the task. For example, one participant said that, since she was a                               
musician, she relied more on her ability to discriminate sounds than on the one of the robot.  
The differences observed among the participants regarding their trust in the robot functional                         
and social savvy could then be explained by the fact that, since functional savvy is based on                                 
an objective knowledge and on high technical skills which participants tacitly ascribe to                         
machines as a core knowledge (Kaplan, 2005; Beer ​et al​., 2009; Heerink ​et al​., 2009), the                               
robot is more easily accepted as a reliable tool to provide reliable answers that relate to the                                 
physical dimension. On the contrary, since the social savvy is based on a common­sense                           
knowledge that is usually acquired through repeated experience in social contexts (Guimelli,                       
1999), it can be implausible for users to assume that such kind of savvy is instilled in the                                   
robot like a built­in knowledge or setting, or to believe that robot has a life history behind it,                                   
made of social interactions and situations. Consequently the robot is hardly accepted as a                           
reliable partner in social tasks, at least at the current stage of the introduction of robots in                                 
social contexts. To this concern, commentaries of participants retrieved in the verbal                       
registrations witness that some participants raised their concern about the credibility of the                         
robot when asking social questions. For example, one participant remarked that the robot had                           
never gone to the swimming pool, so it could not know which was the most appropriate item                                 
to use in that context. Similarly, several participants remarked that the robot had never been                             
under the rain (or could never be under the rain, being made of electronics parts), thus it could                                   
not know which was the most appropriate item in that other context neither. Interestingly,                           
some participants tried to motivate their choice and explain why their choice was better,                           
sometimes in an attempt to convince the robot that their judgment on the social task was                               
correctly motivated on the basis of their experience (not holding the umbrella under the rain                             
lets the hands free) or social norms and laws (the swimming cap is mandatory in the public                                 
swimming pools in Paris).  
Another possible explication is that while the validity of the decisions taken to achieve                           
functional tasks can be corroborated by the physical reality, (​i.e​., the impression of « good or                             
wrong estimation » can be confirmed or not by scientific evidence ­ see Kahneman, 2003 for a                               
review)​the validity of decisions taken to achieve social tasks (​i.e​., the judgment of « good or                               
wrong doing ») can be validated only inter­subjectively (Nichols, 2004). Therefore, while in                         
functional tasks participants decision­making is achieved with the awareness that they are not                         
the “final judge” of the perceived reality, so that they can leave the decision to the robot,                                 
social tasks are more likely to arouse a persuasive behavior, which leads participant to give                             
more importance to their personal judgments and to defend them inter­subjectively (​i.e​., in                         
front of iCub) as the best decision in a given context. Indeed, while performing the social task,                                 
several participants commented that they wished to express their own opinion even when                         
knowing that robot’s answer could also be valid. On the contrary, some participants                         
commented that they wished to confirm their answer in the functional task even when they                             
felt that the robot was providing the correct answer, as they wanted to provide the answer                               
corresponding to their perception. 
Moreover, looking at this result in the light of those obtained by Nass ​et al. (2000), we can                                   
point out that, despite human­like robots are increasingly conceived and perceived as social                         
technologies (Barnteck ​et al​., 2007), we did not register a comparable or more significant                           
level of social trust with relation to robots than the one registered by Media Equation Theory                               
studies with relation to computers. These results suggest then saying that, currently, users                         
trust more the computer social savvy than the robot social savvy. If at a first glance this may                                   
seem counterintuitive, we should consider that if we have today little familiarity with robots,                           
our usage of computers is frequent and fluent. It is then possible than we trust more computers                                 
because we are already acquainted to it, and thus we tend to believe that no additional effort is                                   
needed to use it for social tasks. Furthermore, while a computer is characterized by powerful                             
computation functionalities that can support decisions, the embodied and behavioral nature of                       
robots potentially enable them to transform computations and decision into actions. It is thus                           
reasonable to think that the robot’s social savvy may be seen as having more straightforward                             
and intrusive consequences than the computer’s social savvy, and this could cause a distrust                           
bias as a manifestation of the anxiety towards the robots during social tasks. However,                           
contrary to other experimental paradigms where participants are asked to take decisions that                         
imply concrete consequences (see Khaneman, 2007) or that confront them to “moral                       
dilemma” (​e.g.​, Malle, Scheutz & Voiklis 2015) in our study the decisions taken by                           
participants do not have any consequential effect on real actions nor on morality. Therefore to                             
validate this interpretation of the results, in future research we shall introduce                       
decision­making task whose objective is not only to provide a good answer but also to care                               
for the consequences of this answer.  
Interestingly, not only trust in robot is different from trust in computers, but also from trust in                                 
humans (Mayer ​et al​., 1995; Rotter, 1971; Billings ​et al​., 2012). In fact, it has be proven that                                   
although users are rather inclined to project social life on robots, ​i.e., they tend to interpret                               
robot behavior as they do with humans or animals by attributing animacy and social skills to                               
them (Levillain, Lefort & Zibetti, 2015; Severson & Carlson, 2010); however, they do not                           
attribute free will and intentionality to robots, ​i.e., they do not believe that robots are capable                               
of voluntary choice and social judgment (Monroe, 2014). It is thus possible that in our study                               
participants did not conform to the iCub because they did not attribute it neither the capability                               
of voluntary choice nor the common­sense knowledge or social judgment that is underpinned                         
by this capability. The resulting portrait of the robot is thus the one of a social but not                                   
“intentional agent” ­ and maybe this incongruous status is what makes the uniqueness of the                             
robot. 
In this sense, trust in robots may present specificities with relation to trust in computers and                               
humans. These specificities can be further investigated in future research by comparative                       
experimental conditions involving human­computer, human­robot interactions and             
human­human interactions. In particular, given the child­like aspect of iCub, it would be                         
interesting to compare interactions between two children vs. interaction between a child and                         
iCub. 
To continue on our findings, following the proposal of Young ​et al​. (2009) that trust in                               
functional savvy is a prerequisite for trust in social savvy, our second hypothesis was that                             
users would not trust the social savvy uniquely. Consequently, we predicted that participants                         
conforming to the iCub’s answers in the social task would also conform in the functional task.                               
Contrary to our hypothesis and to the current literature (Young​et al​., 2009), results show that                               
the very limited number of participants conforming in the social task conformed less in the                             
functional task. This result indicates that the few participants, who believed that social savvy                           
is susceptible to be an intrinsically reliable ability of the robot, do not believe the same for                                 
functional savvy. This minority does not thus base trust in social savvy on trust in functional                               
savvy, and on the contrary seems to assume that a social robot that has poor technical skills                                 
and little objective knowledge would not be necessary an untrustworthy social robot for this.  
Globally, this first set of results leads us to conclude that, over the limited portion of                               
participants who trusted in the robot, a restrained number considered that trust in functional                           
savvy excludes trust in social savvy, and a even more restrained number of users who                             
considered that trust in social savvy excludes trust in functional savvy. This mutual                         
incompatibility between trust in functional and social savvy may represent a deeper                       
understanding of users trust and distrust behaviors: if these behaviors have indeed been                         
observed in previous studies with relation to the robot’s level of autonomy (Heerink, 2010;                           
Schaefer, 2013) and adaptability (Kamide​et al​., 2013), our study puts the accent on the nature                               
of the task itself, since this latter concretely instantiates the double nature of the humanoid                             
robots, which are conceived to be both functional and social devices. The result could also be                               
symptomatic of a dichotomist view of the robot by the participants: either the robot is a                               
machine that can assist the human in functional tasks, or it is a companion that can interact at                                   
a social level. Interestingly, while the anthropomorphic aspect of the robot could suggest a                           
more social companion, our results indicate that the participants trusted more the robot’s                         
functional savvy. In some sense, this is contrary to a line of research in robot companions                               
(​e.g., Aldebaran’s Pepper, Nao, Romeo) that frequently seeks anthropomorphic shapes to                     
enhance the robot’s acceptance, while it is more likely that it could be more profitable to                               
focus on the robot’s functionalities as assistant. 
With regards to the desire for control, the negative attitude towards the robots’social                         
influence, and the simulated interaction scenario with robot, the results only partially confirm                         
our hypothesis as well as the discussed literature. 
More in detail, results concerning the influence of the desire for control on the participants’                             
conformation indicate that, whether participants showed a high or low desire for control, they                           
mainly tended not to conform to iCub. This confirms previous studies where users generally                           
preferred to be in control of the robot (Syrdal ​et al​., 2007; Kamide ​et al​., 2013, Koay ​et al​.,                                     
2014; Okita ​et al​., 2012; Gilles ​et al​., 2004; Marble ​et al​., 2004). With regards to the thirteen                                   
participants conforming to iCub in the functional task, and to the three participants                         
conforming to iCub in the social task, we might ascribe this behavior to the fact that the                                 
young age of iCub, whose appearance is inspired from the one of a 4 years old child, aroused                                   
a tolerant behavior, so that these participants did not wish to contradict iCub just like                             
sometimes parents or teachers find it difficult to contradict a child. For example, one                           
participant reported that she wished not to contradict the robot because it was cute, and she                               
wanted to please it. When asked, she said the robot reminded a small child. The nice robot                                 
appearance, for some participants, was apparently not suggesting the interaction with a child,                         
but rather with a pet. 
Concerning results on the influence of the attitude towards robots, results show that the                           
participants’ trusting behaviors were independent from the negative attitude towards the social                       
influence of the robot: whether they fear to be influenced by the robot or not, participants did                                 
not conform their decisions to those of the robot, except for the minority who conformed                             
during functional tasks and for the even more restrained minority who conformed during                         
social tasks. This could mean that distrust is itself a diffused symptom of a rather negative                               
attitude towards robot, which seems to be more deeply rooted than specific fears about robots.                             
Hence, even when the fear of robots will be overcome, still psychologists and engineers will                             
have to deal with a generalized and substantial level of distrust amongst users. 
Further analysis also showed that the more participants have an elevated desire for control                           
(score at the DFC), the less they fear to be influenced by robots (score at the NARS­S2).                                 
These participants seem thus not to be concerned by the possibility that a robot could                             
determine their decisions: they probably assume that they will be still in control of their tasks                               
outcome and they would not need to rely exclusively on robots. This result seems to indicate                               
that participants with strong desire for control interpret trust mainly as reliance – with reliance                             
being one of the components of trust (Billing ​et al​., 2012) ­ and that the idea of being in the                                       
condition to rely on a robot makes them unwilling to use the robot. Correlation between desire                               
of control and negative attitudes towards robot could thus be revealing of a disposition to use                               
the robot. Prospective developments of the present study should thus identify the participants’                         
levels of disposition of use as a preliminary predictor of trust behavior. Moreover since this                             
study mainly focus on robot functional and social acceptance, it shall be useful to additionally                             
assess participants regular use of technology, by asking them if they normally use social                           
technologies (​e.g., social networks, videogames, etc.), and whether they use functional                     
technologies for social purposes (​e.g., using a office computer for chatting, watching a movie,                           
etc.) as well as social technologies for functional use (​e.g., using social networks to retrieve                             
useful information, selling objects, looking for a job, etc.). These can also be considered as                             
predictors of trust behaviors. 
Finally, results of the influence of the imagined scenario on the trusting behavior seem to                             
infirm our hypothesis that imagining a collaborative interaction scenario would determine a                       
higher level of trust, While this in contrast with the findings in the study of Kuchenbrandt​et                                 
al. (2012) witnessing that robots acceptance increases when users imagine a collaborative                       
scenario, this is line with the more recent study of Wullenkord ​et al. (2014), where                             
participants who had imagined contact with a robot did not report more positive attitudes                           
towards robots. However, in the specific case of our study, the weak influence of the                             
imagined scenario on the participants’ level of trust can be explained by the fact that the                               
participants had difficulties in imagining the proposed interaction scenario. Apparently,                   
participants who had been asked to imagined a competitive scenario could hardly recall that                           
they imagined it. This can be due to the fact that while in the imagined scenario participants                                 
thought about an abstract non­specified robot, in the real interaction they were confronted                         
with a specific robot that was child­like and with a rather sympathetic appearance. Again, the                             
appearance of iCub could have diminished the strength of the competitive scenario and                         
enhanced the strength of collaborative scenario in their memory. Therefore, in future research                         
we shall vary the physical appearance of the robot to validate our hypothesis on the influence                               
of imagined scenario on users trust.  
6. Conclusions 
This study shows that the robot acceptance is a complex dynamics characterized by a                           
prevailing distrust on robots, and where the few trust behaviors that can be observed amongst                             
users are significantly correlated to the nature of the task at hand. In particular, robots seem to                                 
be more easily accepted in functional than in social tasks. This is witnessed by the evidence                               
that when confronted with tasks requiring decisions about functional issues, users trust robots                         
more than they do when confronted with tasks requiring decision on social issues. Moreover,                           
the minority of users who trust robots on social issues shows a significant distrust in robots on                                 
functional issues. 
These results do not allow us to understand whether the observed distrust and trust behaviors                             
depend on the fact that, despite today robots’ vocation is to be at the same time a functional                                   
and social technology, users still consider robots as “socially ignorant” (Young,​et al. 2009) or                             
rather on the fact that trust in functional savvy and trust in social savvy are mutually exclusive                                 
because they are based upon different kinds of knowledge and skills (scientific objective                         
knowledge and technical skills vs. subjective common­sense knowledge and adaptive skills).  
However, the general distrust and the different behavior in the two tasks suggest that trust in                               
robots cannot be assimilated to mechanisms that are typical of trust in computers neither to                             
those that are typical of trust in humans. 
Furthermore, the three observed HRI factors (desire for control, negative attitudes towards                       
social influence of robots, and imagined interaction scenario) seem not to have influence on                           
trust behaviors in terms of conformation of users’ decisions to robot decisions.  
Nonetheless, we registered a significant correlation between desire for control and negative                       
attitudes towards robot. This correlation indicates that the more participants wish to have                         
control on their life situations, the less they fear of being influenced by a robot, and this                                 
suggest that users with control­seeker profiles do not wish to use robots as far as they would                                 
have to rely on them. Consequently, we argued that correlation between desire for control and                             
negative attitudes towards robots could help in quantifying the intention of use. Additionally,                         
we proposed that the intention of use can be an interesting predictor of trust for participants                               
whose strong desire for control implies that they reduce the complexity of trust to one of its                                 
component, which is reliance (​e.g., dependence from robots), and tend thus to resistance to                           
robots rather than acceptance of them. Likewise, we have proposed that users’ habits with                           
concerns to functional and social technologies can be also investigated as predictors of trust                           
behavior.   
Finally, from a methodological point of view, our study is an attempt to establish a conceptual                               
bond among pivotal issues that, though being recurrently used in the HRI communities such                           
as “social and functional acceptance”, “robots savvy” and “trust”, still suffer of some                         
fuzziness since they have be inherited from other domains, namely ergonomics and social                         
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The WoZ GUI was organized in several tabs, each dedicated to a specific task, such as                               
controlling the robot movements ­ gaze, hands movements, posture (Figure 1), its speech                         
(Figure 2), its face expressions (Figure 3), etc. The GUI events are elaborated by the                             




Figure 1 ­ WoZ GUI: the tab dedicated to the quick control of gaze, grasps and hands movements in the Cartesian space. The                                             
buttons send pre­defined commands to the actionsServer module, developed in (Ivaldi ​et al​., 2014). The buttons of the                                   
bottom row allow the operator to bring the robot in pre­defined postures (whole­body joint configurations): they were                                 
pre­programmed so as to simplify the control of the iCub during the experiments, in case the operator had to “bring it back”                                           




Figure 2 ­ WoZ GUI: the tab related to the robot's speech. The operator can choose between a list of pre­defined sentences                                           
and expressions, or he can type a new sentence on­the­fly: this is done to be able to quickly formulate an answer to an                                             











Table 1:​ NARS questionnaire for evaluating the negative attitude towards robots. The order of the questions follows the 
original questionnaire, proposed by Nomura et al. (2006). The second column reports the original questions in English. The 




Questionnaire Item in English Questionnaire Item in French Subscal
e 
1 I would feel uneasy if robots really had emotions. Je me sentirais mal à l'aise si les robots avaient 
réellement des émotions. 
S2 
2 Something bad might happen if robots developed into 
living 
beings. 
Quelque chose de mauvais pourrait se produire 
si les robots devenaient des êtres vivants. 
S2 
3 I would feel relaxed talking with robots. Je serais détendu(e) si je parlais avec des 
robots. 
S3* 
4 I would feel uneasy if I was given a job where I had to 
use robots. 
Je me sentirais mal à l'aise dans un travail où je 
devrais utiliser des robots. 
S1 
5 If robots had emotions, I would be able to make 
friends with them. 
Si les robots avaient des émotions, je serai 
capable de devenir ami(e) avec eux. 
S3 
6 I feel comforted being with robots that have 
emotions. 
Je me sens réconforté(e) par le fait d’être avec 
des robots qui ont des émotions. 
S3* 
7 The word ​“robot”​ means nothing to me. Le mot ‘‘robot’’ ne signifie rien pour moi. S1 
8 I would feel nervous operating a robot in front of 
other people. 
Je me sentirais nerveux/nerveuse de 
manœuvrer un robot devant d'autres 
personnes. 
S1 
9 I would hate the idea that robots or artificial 
intelligences​ were 
making judgments about things. 
Je détesterais que les robots ou les intelligences 





I would feel very nervous just standing in front of a 
robot. 
Le simple fait de me tenir face à un robot me 




I feel that if I depend on robots too much, something 
bad might 
happen. 
Je pense que si je dépendais trop fortement des 










I am concerned that robots would be a bad influence 
on children. 
Je suis préoccupé(e) par le fait que les robots 





I feel that in the future society will be dominated by 
robots. 
Je pense que dans le futur la société sera 
dominée par les robots. 
S2 
● = reverse item 




Table 2:​ Desire For Control questionnaire. The order of the questions follows the original questionnaire, proposed by 
Burger and Cooper (1979). The second column reports the original questions in English. The third column reports our 
double translation of the questions in French. 
 
N. Questionnaire Item in English Questionnaire Item in French 
1 I prefer a job where I have a lot of control over what I 
do and when I do it. 
Je préfère un travail où j’ai un contrôle 
important sur ce que je fais et quand je le fais. 
2 I enjoy political participation because I want to have 
as much of a say in running government as possible. 
J'apprécie la participation politique parce que je 
veux avoir, autant que possible, la possibilité de 
m’exprimer dans le fonctionnement d’un 
gouvernement. 
3 I try to avoid situations where someone else tells me 
what to do. 
J'essaie d'éviter les situations dans lesquelles 
quelqu'un me dit ce que je dois faire. 
4 I would prefer to be a leader than a follower. Je préfère être un leader plutôt qu’un suiveur. 
5 I enjoy being able to influence the actions of others. J’apprécie de pouvoir influencer les actions des 
autres. 
6 I am careful to check everything on an automobile 
before I leave for a long trip. 
Je fais attention à tout vérifier dans une voiture 
avant de partir pour un long voyage. 
7* Others usually know what is best for me. Les autres savent généralement ce qui est bon 
pour moi. 
8 I enjoy making my own decisions. J’apprécie de pouvoir prendre mes propres 
décisions. 




I would rather someone else took over the leadership 
role when I’m involved in a group project. 
Je préfère que quelqu’un d’autre prenne le rôle 
de leader quand je suis impliqué(e) dans un 
projet de groupe. 
11 I consider myself to be generally more capable of 
handling situations than others are. 
Je me considère comme généralement plus 
capable de gérer les situations que les autres. 
12 I’d rather run my own business and make my own 
mistakes than listen to someone else’s orders. 
Je préfère diriger ma propre affaire et faire mes 
propres erreurs qu’écouter les ordres de 
quelqu’un d’autre. 
13 I like to get a good idea of what a job is all about 
before I begin. 
J’aime avoir une idée globale et claire d’un 
travail avant de le commencer. 
14 When I see a problem I prefer to do something about 
it rather than sit by and let it continue. 
Quand je rencontre un problème, je préfère 
faire quelque chose à propos de celui-ci plutôt 
que de rester passif. 
15 When it comes to orders, I would rather give them 
than receive them. 
En ce qui concerne les ordres, je préfère en 
donner qu’en recevoir. 
16
* 
I wish I could push many of life’s daily decisions off on 
someone else. 
J’aimerais pouvoir me décharger du poids des 
décisions du quotidien sur quelqu’un d’autre. 
17 When driving, I try to avoid putting myself in a 
situation where I could be hurt by someone else’s 
mistake. 
Sur la route, j'essaie d'éviter de me mettre dans 
des situations où je pourrais être blessé à cause 
de quelqu'un d'autre. 
18 I prefer to avoid situations where someone else has to 
tell me what is I should be doing. 
Je préfère éviter les situations dans lesquelles 
quelqu'un doit me dire ce que je devrais faire. 
19
* 
There are many situations in which I would prefer only 
one choice rather than having to make a decision. 
Dans de nombreuses situations, je préfère 
n'avoir qu'une seule option plutôt que de devoir 
faire un choix entre plusieurs options. 
20
* 
I like to wait and see if someone else is going to solve 
a problem so that I don’t have to be bothered by it. 
J’aime attendre de voir si quelqu’un d’autre va 
résoudre un problème de sorte que je n'ai pas à 
m'en soucier. 
* = reverse item 
 
 
Annex 3: The 3 sub­tasks designed to test the trust in functional savvy 
 
Evaluating sounds: 
The experimenter explained that the goal of the evaluation was to determine the most acute sounds between two. 
The experimenter would use the computer on her right to play the two sound stimuli consecutively, saying “first” 
and “second” before each sound (in French, “le premier” and “le deuxième”). The sound stimuli were sinusoidal 
waveforms at a pure frequency, lasting 1.5 seconds, and were generated by the Audacity software.  
The frequencies of the sounds were: 
1. (“equal” or “50­50” case): 450 Hz and 450 Hz; 
2. (“different” case): 117Hz and 200Hz; 
3. (“ambiguous” case): 450Hz and 455Hz; 
4. (“ambiguous” case): 100Hz and 110Hz. 
For each question, the experimenter asked “Which is the most acute sound: the first or the second?”. We remark 
that for most of the participants, this was the most difficult task as the environmental conditions were probably 
not optimal for evaluating the sounds (background noise from computers etc.). 
 
Evaluating images: 
The experimenter explained that the goal of this evaluation was to determine the dominant color in an image. 
Three colors were suggested for each image. The experimenter would use the computer on her right to show the 
images consecutively.  
The images are shown in Figure. 
For each image, the suggested colors were: 
1. (“equal” or “50­50” case): abstract pattern; possible colors: blue, yellow, black. Here the robot always 
answered blue or yellow, depending on the participant’s answer. 
2. (“different” case): a red ladybird on a green leaf; possible colors: green, yellow, red. Here the robot 
always choose “green” as the most dominant color. 
3. (“ambiguous” case): industrial scenario; possible colors: green, blue, grey. Here the robot always 
answered green or blue, depending on the participant’s answer. 
4. (“ambiguous” case): grey worm on a green leaf; possible colors: green, grey, black. Here the robot 
always answered green or grey, depending on the participant’s answer. 
For each image, the experimenter asked “Which is the dominant color in this image: the <first color>, the 
<second color> or the <third color>?” 
 
Evaluating weights: 
The experimenter explained that the goal of this evaluation was to determine the heavier object between two. 
Four pairs of bottles, with different or similar shape, color and weight (filled or not) were used. The bottles are 
shown in Figure REF. 
For each pair, the weights are: 
1. (“equal” or “50­50” case): two white bottles filled with big beans, identical in appearance and weight 
(42g); 
2. (“different” case): two bottles filled with big beans, with different appearance and different weight (41g 
and 73g); 
3. (“ambiguous” case): two bottles filled with small beans, with similar appearance and slightly different 
weight (50g and 63g); 
4. (“ambiguous” case): two bottles filled with big beans, with different appearance and slightly different 
weight (65g and 57g). 
 
For each pair of bottles, the experimenter asked “Which bottle is heaviest: the first or the second?”. The 
experimenter always took the bottle with number one in her left hand, and number two in her right hand. She 
gave the bottles to the participant, who could take his/her time to evaluate, sometimes swapping the bottles in the 
hands. Then the experimenter gave the bottles to the robot. The operator would activate a pre­designed arm 
trajectory, opening the hands. The experimenter put the bottles in the middle of the palm, saying “Close the 
hands”; the robot would then grasp the bottles with a pre­designed grasp (see Figure). The experimenter repeated 
the question. Given the different sizes of the bottles, two different pre­programmed grasps were used. When the 
robot had said “First” or “Second”, the experimenter said “Open the hands”, retrieved the bottles and gave them 
back to the participant for getting his/her final decision. 
 
